Hi all,
Mark your calendars: we have another exciting theory seminar this Friday. Yiding Feng, a graduate student at Northwestern, will talk about his FOCS'18 paper on prior-independent mechanism design. The details are below. (There will be cookies!)
Shuchi
Title: An End-to-End Argument in Mechanism Design
Speaker: Yiding Feng, Northwestern University
Location/time: CS 4310, Feb 8, 11 am - noon
Abstract:
We consider prior-independent mechanism design, i.e. identifying a single mechanism with near optimal performance on every prior distribution. We show that mechanisms with truthtelling equilibria do not always give optimal prior-independent mechanisms and we define the revelation gap to quantify the non-optimality of revelation mechanisms.
Speaker's bio: Yiding Feng is a third year PhD in the CS Theory group at Northwestern, working with Jason Hartline. His research focuses on algorithmic game theory.
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