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Re: [HTCondor-users] condor_ssh_to_job
- Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 12:00:06 -0500
- From: Todd Tannenbaum <tannenba@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: Re: [HTCondor-users] condor_ssh_to_job
On 8/13/2014 7:13 AM, Keith Brown wrote:
so, what is the point of condor_ssh_job? if a user can start hundreds of
processes he can just ssh into his job and occupy slots indefinitely.
there must be a way for an administrator to control access to
condor_ssh_job.
There is a fundamental misunderstanding in this thread...
When you condor_ssh_to_job, HTCondor starts up an sshd _in the same slot
as the job_, and thus the ssh session is subject to all the same
administrator policies as the batch job itself. It is NOT an arbitrary
unmanaged ssh session - it is fully managed just as if it was part of
the user's job itself. That is the beauty of it. For instance, the sshd
is started underneath the condor_starter, will be killed along with
anything started via that ssh session whenever the policy says to kill
the batch job. It is also subject to any slot usage restrictions
(memory, cpu, etc - i.e. if you are enforcing slot memory usage with
cgroups, your ssh usage is included in the memory usage for that slot).
Above Keith worries that a user could just ssh into his job and occupy
all slots indefinitely - how is this different from a user submitting a
batch job that runs forever? In both cases, you as the administrator
could setup your PREEMPT expression to kick off jobs after X amount of
time, or a PREEMPTION_REQUIREMENTS expression to kick off the job if the
resource is desired by someone else, etc.
Think of it this way - imagine if HTCondor did not have ssh_to_job. Do
you allow users provide their own executable for their job? Most likely
you do. If so, a user could submit a shell script that that forks off
their own sshd alongside alongside their job and get the same thing as
condor_ssh_to_job.
We disable this feature at Fermilab and I would strongly suggest that any
other cluster do the same, it is an uncontrollable access hole. If you care
about security at all don't turn it on.
Steve Timm
Above one of the very rare instances where I disagree with Steve (99.9%
of the time I am in full agreement w/ him!). But if you feel the same
as Steve, you can disable condor_ssh_to_job fully or selectively via
config knob ENABLE_SSH_TO_JOB, as per Dan's post earlier this morning.
regards,
Todd